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A significant segment of the housing market is governed by choices
and decisions made by the elderly. The importance of this segment will
be even greater in the future because the share of elderly Americans
in the total population will be steadily increasing. For the elderly, hous-
ing choices are more complex than the choice of housing expenditure,
dwelling size, tenure, etc., of their own dwelling. In particular for the
older elderly, a potential alternative to living independently is to live
in one household with their adult children or to share accommodations
with other elderly. The decision to dissolve the household, and the
consequent choice of living arrangements, is the focus of this paper.
The choice of living arrangements is an important aspect of the well-
being of the elderly and the economics of aging because of its side-
effects in the provision of care and the physical environment that this
choice implies. Sharing accommodations, in particular with adult chil-
dren, will not only provide housing but also some degree of medical
care and social support for the elderly. If elderly persons perceive
sharing accommodations as an inferior housing alternative and remain
living independently as long as their physical and economic means
allow, this social support and a larger amount of medical care have to
be picked up by society at large rather than the family or close friends.
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Household dissolution decisions also have obvious consequences for
the intergenerational distribution of housing. In particular, in times of
tight housing market conditions with very high housing prices for newly
developed units, the elderly's willingness to move out of the family
home is an important parameter in the supply of more affordable ex-
isting homes. There is also the subtle question of intergenerational
equity when the elderly are perceived as being "overhoused," that is,
living in houses that are relatively more spacious than those of younger
families with children.
This paper studies the economic and demographic determinants of
the elderly's decision to continue living independently or to choose
some kind of shared accommodations. The main questions being asked
are:
• How many elderly live independently? Does this percentage exhibit
a similar development as in the nonelderly population?
• Who are the elderly living independently? Are they younger, are
they wealthier?
• How many elderly live with their children? If so, do they head the
household, or are they "received" by their children?
• How many distantly related and unrelated elderly share
accommodations ?
• Are economic conditions (income, housing prices) important de-
terminants for the choice between living independently or sharing
accommodations? Or is the decision to give up an independent
household simply determined by age and health?
• Do only the less wealthy and older elderly "seek refuge" in their
childrens' homes?
• Who are the "hosts" for subfamilies? Do they tend to be richer
(because they can afford supplying extra shelter) or do they tend
to be poorer (because they cannot afford privacy)?
The paper is organized in three parts. We first contrast living ar-
rangements of elderly Americans with the population under the age of
65 years, describe the changes from 1974 to 1983, and compare housing
choices in SMSAs with those in nonmetropolitan areas and study re-
gional variations. Our main result in this descriptive analysis is the
discrepancy of the trends of household formation/dissolution between
the elderly and the younger population; after a steady decline in the
1970s, who observe a rapid increase in the rate of "doubled-up" young
families in the beginning of the 1980s. No such development can be
found among elderly Americans. The proportion of the elderly living
independently steadily increases in our sample period from 1974 to
1983.121 Household Dissolution and Alternative Living Arrangements
In the second part, we estimate a formal choice model among living
independently and six categories of alternative living arrangements.
The main finding is the predominance of demographic determinants as
opposed to economic explanations. This is not too surprising, but some-
what frustrating for an economist. To our relief, the data indicate a
growing importance of income in this choice. We also discover a strik-
ing difference in the importance of income between the poor elderly
and the well-to-do.
Finally, we employ these estimation results to explain the discrep-
ancy in the development of household formation/dissolution between
the young and the elderly.
4.2 Data and Household Decomposition
Our analysis is based on the Linked National Sample, 1974 to 1983,
of the Annual Housing Survey, now called American Housing Survey
(AHS). Our primary reason for employing the AHS is its very large
sample size that allows us to make inferences about infrequent choices
and to conduct subgroup analyses. The careful recording of household
composition makes it possible to detect elderly living as subfamilies or
as "secondary individuals" in households headed by their children or
other younger persons. Another important advantage of the AHS for
the study of housing decisions is its inclusion of structural housing
characteristics that allow a precise definition of housing prices. Data
sets such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the
Retirement History Survey (RHS) allow only the construction of simple
expenditure measures uncorrected for quality differences.
However, it should be pointed out that the AHS has also several
severe shortcomings. Though the dwelling units are linked over time,
the households or individuals living in these units are not. This prevents
any dynamic analysis without stringent assumptions on the transition
probabilities. The analysis in this paper is strictly cross-sectional and
static; a limited dynamic version of the model in the second part of
this paper is the subject of a sequel to this paper. The AHS does not
contain a systematic record of the functional health status of the el-
derly.
1 We will depend on age as an indicator for health also, relying
on the fact that age-specific medical cost and hospitalization patterns
have been relatively stable for the last two decades (see Poterba and
Summers 1985). Finally, the AHS includes all elderly that live in regular
housing units but not the institutionalized population. Hence, the choice
among alternative living arrangements excludes the choice of the con-
tinuum between congregate housing and nursing homes, alternatives
that are becoming increasingly popular.
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Therefore, most housing data are collected on a household level,
with much information about individual household members subsumed
in a household total. This is the case in the Census, to some degree in
the PSID, and in the AHS. However, once one realizes that many
elderly do not live independently, and that the choice between living
independently and sharing accommodations is an important decision,
one must veiw households as an outcome of such decisions rather than
an exogenously given sampling unit. If the alternative living arrange-
ments are endogenous, the primary decision unit in housing choice
analysis must be smaller than the household, and a fairly narrow def-
inition of a family is more appropriate. A suitable decision unit is the
(family-) nucleus, defined as follows:
A nucleus consists of a married couple or a single individual with all
their own children below age 18.
Households are formed as an outcome of living arrangement decisions
made by individual nuclei. In many cases, the household is formed by
only one nucleus. Typical examples of multi-nuclei households are
elderly parents in the household of their children, adult children still
living in the household of their parents, or roommates. We can distin-
guish four types of households:
(1) Households consisting of only one nucleus.
(2) Households composed of nuclei with family relations (in this
household type, child-parent relationships are of particular
interest).
(3) Households composed of nuclei without family relations.
(4) Complex households, that is, a combination of the latter two
types.
Therefore, our first step in analyzing the data is to create a data base
in which the appropriate decision unit, the nucleus, is the sampling
unit. This is achieved by detecting elderly subfamilies in existing house-
holds and splitting up households of type (2) through (4) into several
nuclei. This household decomposition is based on the demographic and
financial information on individual household members available in the
AHS. Variables like income, nucleus size, etc., are apportioned
accordingly.
3
Our analysis will be based on 19,154 elderly nuclei. A nucleus is
considered elderly if at least one person in the nucleus is above the
age of 65 years. For some comparisons, we also use a "control sample"
of 19,938 younger nuclei. These samples were drawn as follows. The
original AHS data base consists of dwellings that are tracked through
nine cross-sections from 1974 through 1983 (with the exception of 1982).
First, we systematically sampled every fourth dwelling from the orig-123 Household Dissolution and Alternative Living Arrangements
inal AHS. Of those, every dwelling in which at least one elderly person
lived was sampled, and every fourth of the remaining dwellings. We
then decomposed each household according to the above rules into
nuclei—cross section by cross section.
As was already mentioned, this analysis does not attempt to track
individual nuclei over time. Because the AHS cross-sections are linked
across time by dwelling only, households will appear and vanish in the
sample whenever they move. Hence, only a panel of stayer households
could be constructed. Tracking nuclei over time introduces additional
difficulties, because nuclei must be identified in each cross section and
then be matched over time. This matching is nontrivial because of
demographic changes (death or institutionalization) that are con-
founded by the frequent occurrence of unreliable demographic data.
Because we treat observations of the same nucleus in separate years
as independent observations, the above 19,154 nuclei should more pre-
cisely be termed "nucleus-years." We estimate that the elderly sample
contains approximately 5,000 different nuclei.
4.3 Living Arrangements
We will describe the choice of an elderly nucleus among the following
seven types of living arrangements:
• Living independently (denoted by INDEP).
• Parents living in one household with their adult children either as
head of this joint household (denoted by PARE-H) or as subfamily
in the household headed by the adult child (denoted by PARE-S).
• Living with relatives other than adult children either as head of
this joint household (denoted by DREL-H) or as subfamily in the
household headed by the distant relative (denoted by DREL-S).
• Living with unrelated persons either as head of this joint household
(denoted by NREL-H) or as subfamily in the household headed
by the nonrelative (denoted by NREL-S)
4
These seven types of living arrangements for the elderly are depicted
in figure 4.1. Note that for elderly who do not live independently we
distinguish not only among three different relations to the other house-
hold members (PARE, DREL, NREL), but also between two headship
categories (HEAD and SUBF). This is important because elderly who
dissolve their own household in order to live in their adult childrens'
household are living in an entirely different situation than elderly who
stay in their family home but provide shelter for some of their adult
children. In the first case, an explicit decision to move and to dissolve
the elderly's household has to be made, and the elderly person gives
up the economically important function as a homeowner (or, more124 Axel Borsch-Supan
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rarely, as a renter) to become a subletee. In the second case, the elderly
person avoids the important psychic and physical moving costs and
keeps the status as homeowner.
For the younger nuclei, two additional living arrangements become
relevant:
• Adult children living in one household with their parents either as
head of this joint household (denoted by CHIL-H) or as subfamily
in the household headed by the parent (denoted by CHIL-S).
Table 4.1 presents the proportions in which these living arrangements
are chosen by the elderly. The data are stratified by year of cross section
(1974 through 1983, except for 1982), by the four census regions (North-
east, Midwest, South, and West), and by whether the dwelling is located
in an SMSA or a nonmetropolitan area. For comparison, table 4.2
presents the same proportions for younger nuclei. Based on more than
19,000 observations, the entries have a standard deviation of less than
0.36 percentage points.
More than two-third of all elderly nuclei live independently, that is,
either as a married couple or as a single person forming a household.
This proportion increases steadily from 1974 to 1983. More detailed
tabulations show that about 32.5 percent of all elderly nuclei are elderly
living together with their spouses, and about 38.5 percent are elderly
living alone. Almost all of the increase in independent elderly nuclei
is generated by an increase in the single-person nuclei. A continuation
of this trend will have serious consequences in the delivery of health
care and social support, because the elderly seem to become increas-
ingly isolated and detached from their traditional source of medical and
social support.
The percentage of elderly living independently is highest in the West













































































































































































and is much higher in rural areas as compared to metropolitan areas.
The latter result is surprising and in contrast to common beliefs about
rural and nonrural living arrangements.
The growing number of independent nuclei is particularly significant
because it is not typical for the population at large. Comparing the
trend among elderly nuclei with the development among younger nuclei
(first column in tables 4.1 and 4.2) yields a striking result: there is a
large discrepancy in the development of household formation and dis-
solution between the elderly and the young. Whereas the percentage
of all elderly nuclei living independently rises from 69.3 percent in 1974
to 73.0 percent in 1983, the percentage of nuclei in the younger part
of the population that lives independently fluctuates around 55 percent
throughout the second half of the 1970s and then markedly declines to
52.4 percent in 1983.
How does this discrepancy come about? In particular, why is there
no increase in alternative living arrangements in the early 1980s? This
question will be the focus of the balance of this paper. Before discussing
potential explanations, we will analyze the importance of the six de-
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Living together with one's own adult children is the most important
alternative living arrangement. Of the 28.9 percent of those elderly
nuclei who share accommodations with other nuclei, about 60 percent
live in the same household as their adult children do. In most of these
cases, the elderly nucleus is household head, not the adult child. Cor-
responding to the increasing proportion of elderly living independently
(especially living alone), parent-child households decline as alternative
living arrangements. However, the relative importance of being head
or subfamily in an elderly parent-adult child household shifts dramat-
ically (columns PARE-H and PARE-S): in 1974, about 64 percent of all
elderly parent-adult child households were headed by the elderly; in
1983, more than 73 percent. The percentage of parent-child nuclei is
lower in the Midwest and the West, and markedly lower in nonmet-
ropolitan areas as compared to SMS As.
The third and fourth columns in table 4.2 (labeled CHIL-H and
CHIL-S) represent the mirror image of elderly parent-adult child
households, now relative to the living arrangements chosen by younger
nuclei. Column three displays again the decline in headship rates of
adult children in parent-children households. Note that the proportion
of both elderly parent-adult child living arrangements among all living
arrangements chosen by younger nuclei households stays approxi-
mately constant as opposed to the relative decline of this choice among
elderly nuclei—reflecting the changing age distribution in the United
States toward a higher proportion of elder Americans and a relatively
declining "supply" of younger nuclei for joint households.
About 8.7 percent of all elderly nuclei live doubled-up with relatives
other than their own children (categories DREL-H and DREL-S). This
percentage exhibits a similar declining trend as parent-child house-
holds, from 9.8 percent in 1974 to 7.4 percent in 1983. Again, this trend
is in striking contrast to the younger population in which the relative
share of this kind of living arrangement increases from 7.0 percent in
1974 to 9.5 percent in 1983.
Only a very small percentage of elderly nuclei (3.0 percent) share a
household with nonrelated household members (living arrangements
NREL-H and NREL-S in tables 4.1 and 4.2). This percentage is more
or less stable in 1974-83 and is slightly lower than the corresponding
percentage in younger households (3.4 percent), where we observe a
distinct increase from about 2.5 percent in 1974-76 to about 4.5 percent
in the early 1980s.
4.4 Determinants of Living Arrangements
Who are the nuclei who live alone, and who are the nuclei who share
accommodations? In this section, we will collect descriptive statistics128 Axel Borsch-Supan
of the most important financial and demographic characteristics by
living arrangement: income, age, marital status, sex, and size of the
nucleus. These variables, among others, will influence the demand for
housing of each nucleus where housing choices are understood to also
include the way in which accommodations are shared with other nuclei.
In the case of shared accommodations, these variables will also influ-
ence the "supply" of living arrangements by the head nuclei. Short of
formulating some kind of demand-supply relationship of household
formulation,
5 we will display some of these variables not only by nu-
cleus (as a determinant of demand), but also by each nucleus's re-
spective head nucleus (as a determinant of supply).
We will first concentrate on demand. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 tabulate the
income of each nucleus. Average nucleus income for elderly is $11,150
compared to $15,450 for nonelderly nuclei. (These dollar amounts cor-
respond to 1980 figures, and are deflated with the Consumer Price
Index.) The respective household incomes are $14,100 for the elderly
population and $22,450 for the nonelderly. The income of the elderly
is 87 percent transfer income; in turn, 80.1 percent of nonelderly nuclei



























































































































































































































































































































































aINDEP category includes PARE-H category.
The row averages in the last columns of tables 4.3 and 4.4 indicate
the income development from 1974 to 1983. Real income of elderly
nuclei went up almost steadily from $10,470 to $12,340, essentially due
to doubly indexed transfer income. This is in stark contrast to the
general real income development. Real income of nonelderly nuclei
essentially stayed constant in our sample period—it increased from
1974 to 1979, then decreased rapidly back to the 1974 level. If household
formation is income elastic, the diverging income distribution is a for-
midable explanation for the discrepancy in household formation trends
between the young and the elderly. The choice model in section 4.5
will try to estimate this elasticity.
The intergenerational income distribution also exhibits some inter-
esting regional variation: for both elderly and nonelderly, income is
highest in the West and higher in urban than in nonmetropolitan areas.
In the Northeast, where income of young nuclei is below the national
average, elderly nuclei receive an above-average real income.
Not surprisingly, there is a large income gap between nuclei living
as head and nuclei living as subfamilies. Head elderly nuclei generally
earn more than twice as much as subfamilies. However, this difference130 Axel Borsch-Supan
in income between subfamilies and head nuclei is less pronounced
among elderly than among younger nuclei (table 4.4). Headship clearly
has a strongly positive income elasticity. Among younger nuclei, nuclei
living in any kind of shared accommodations have lower incomes than
nuclei living independently. Not only headship but also living indepen-
dently has a positive income elasticity for younger nuclei. This is not
necessarily the case with elderly nuclei. Elderly parents who head a
joint household with their adult children exhibit larger average incomes
than those living independently, and their income rose dramatically
from 1974 to 1983. Hence, we observe not only an increasing share of
elderly who live as heads of two-generation households (table 4.1), but
also that these elderly are very different from the nuclei we would most
likely expect to "double-up."
The above observation may be attributable to the demand for or the
supply of shared housing opportunities. The stratification by region
and urbanization in table 4.3 may yield some clues to help us separate
demand from supply: in metropolitan areas, in the Northeast, and in
the West—where housing prices rose most during the late 1970s and
early 1980s—this income gap is largest; in nonmetropolitan areas and
in the South—areas less affected by housing market pressures—it is
reversed. Elderly parents with an existing family home owned free and
clear seem to provide an increasing amount of housing for the younger
generation. Hence, this development may be a supply effect on the
part of the elderly and a demand effect on the part of the younger
generation.
This finding would also indicate that the supply elasticity for shared
accommodations is positive, because those parents who are "host"
for the younger generation appear to be wealthier than average. In
general, we may distinguish two contradictory hypotheses about the
supply elasticity for shared housing. In addition to the hypothesis that
only a wealthy nucleus can afford being a "host" for another nucleus
(positive income elasticity of supply), it may also be reasoned that only
poor nuclei will offer to share accommodations with other nuclei, since
in this way they can save on housing costs by splitting them with the
"guest" nucleus (negative income elasticity of supply).
Table 4.5 sheds some light on this question. It tabulates the income
of the head nucleus by the living arrangement of each nucleus. Hence,
columns referring to head nuclei (labeled INDEP or ending in -H) are
identical to table 4.3, whereas columns referring to subfamilies (labels
ending with -S) now indicate the income of the respective head nucleus.
For distant relatives and nonrelatives living with each other, incomes
are roughly comparable (the yearly averages for these living arrange-
ments are based on cells with 25 to 150 observations and carry large
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lower than average. In these cases the distinction between supply and
demand for shared living arrangements may be as artificial as the dis-
tinction between head nuclei and subfamilies, and we observe the gen-
erally declining tendency to double-up when income is increasing.
The situation is quite different among elderly parent-adult children
households. If elderly parents live in the same household as their chil-
dren, and the children are head of the household, then the children
have a markedly higher income ($20,140, third column of table 4.5,
roughly corresponding to the income in the second column of table 4.4,
its mirror image) than the average income of young nuclei ($15,450).
Conversely, if elderly parents head a two-generation household, they
earn more than the average elderly nucleus ($13,020 versus $11,150).
This pattern is true in all of the four census regions and in metropolitan
and nonmetropolitan areas alike. This finding rejects the hypothesis of
a negative income elasticity of supply of living arrangements when two-
generation households are concerned.
Stated differently, economic considerations such as saving housing
costs may well play a role when distantly related or unrelated nuclei
double-up. Not only the demand but also the supply elasticity declines
with income. The mechanisms that create two-generation households132 Axel Borsch-Supan
seem more complicated. Income clearly indicates which nucleus plays
the headship role. The data include elderly parents who provide housing
for adult children constrained by the housing affordability crisis in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, and we observe adult children with above-
average income who provide housing for their elderly parents. To study
the economic incentives in these two-generation households more care-
fully, we would need to know the elderly parents' health status.
Tables 4.6 through 4.9 present the main demographic determinants
of the choice among living arrangements: age, nucleus size, and sex
of nucleus head, relevant mostly for single elderly nuclei.
6
The last column of table 4.6 reflects the aging of the American pop-
ulation. Average age increased from 69.2 years to 69.8 years in the
decade considered. It is important to realize that this change is more
pronounced in the category of elderly who live independently. Once
again, this points out the increasing burden of social support and health
care that has to be borne by society at large rather than the immediate
family. Table 4.7 displays the corresponding age profile: only after age
75 does the proportion of elderly Americans living independently de-
cline with a corresponding increase of living arrangements within the
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Table 4.7 Frequency of Living Arrangements by Age (percentage of
elderly nuclei)














































Table 4.8 Size of Nucleus by Living Arrangements (elderly nuclei;
number of persons)





















































































1.5 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.5
The columns in table 4.6 represent the relation between multi-nuclei
living arrangements and age. Subfamilies tend to be older than head
nuclei, a finding that may be explained by the health status of older
and therefore more dependent nuclei. In the case of elderly parents
living in the home of their adult children, the age of the parent nucleus
is particularly high (76.8 years).
7 This relates back to the discussion of
the role of income in forming two-generation households and the im-
portance of the elderly parent's health status in that decision.
Surprising, however, is the fact that elderly parents who head a joint
household with their adult children are not only younger than average
nuclei, but also became even more so in the time from 1974 to 1983.
It is interesting to relate this finding to the ownership rates in table
4.10. These ownership rates represent the percentage of nuclei who
live in a dwelling that is owned by the head nucleus rather than rented.
The second and third columns in table 4.10 show that the average
ownership rates of a two-generation family home are virtually un-
changed in our sample period. However, the proportion of family homes
owned by the elderly parent increases, whereas the proportion of homes














































































































































































Furthermore, the age profiles in the second and third columns of
table 4.10 show the reversal of roles with increasing age, the crucial
age being 75 years, after which more elderly become subfamilies rather
than heads and at which the rate of independently living elderly nuclei























Ownership Rates of Head Nuclei by Living Arrangements
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of all other living arrangements also strongly declines after the age of
75. In passing, note the low ownership rates of living arrangements
among nonrelatives. All age patterns exhibit little variation across re-
gions and degree of urbanization (see table 4.6).
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 shed more light on the demographic characteristics
of living arrangements, particularly two-generation households. El-
derly living in the household headed by their adult children are almost
always single and mostly female, whereas elderly parents who are heads
in a two-generation household are more often but by no means exclu-
sively couples. Living arrangements with nonrelatives are most fre-
quently chosen by single male elderly persons, particularly in the
Midwest.
4.5 A Multinomial Logit Model of the Choice
among Living Arrangements
The descriptive analysis in section 4.4 pointed out some important
changes in the way elderly Americans live. In addition to the inter-
generational shift in ownership patterns among two-generation house-
holds, the most striking change is the unexpectedly large increase in
the proportion of elderly Americans living independently as opposed
to the reversal of headship rates in the younger population.
What factors are generating the difference in household formation/
dissolution patterns between the elderly and the young? There are two
primary hypotheses. The first could be termed the "inertia hypothesis."
Low mobility, caused by relatively higher monetary and nonmonetary
moving costs for the elderly, creates a slow adaptation of housing
patterns to a changing economic environment among the elderly. Mar-
ket forces that may induce trends in the general market will only very
slowly shift consumption patterns of the elderly. With an increasing
share of the population becoming elderly, the proportion of elderly
living independently among all households will rise. A relatively de-
creasing "supply" of younger households because of the change in the
age distribution will also increase the proportion of elderly living in-
dependently among all elderly nuclei.
The second, the "income distribution hypothesis," rests on the ob-
servation that the economic environment has actually changed much
less for the elderly than for the younger population. Whereas real
income rose in the 1970s and then sharply declined in the beginning of
the 1980s for younger families, this was not the case for the elderly.
The same holds for housing prices. Housing prices were rising dras-
tically at the beginning of the 1980s, but most elderly were already
sitting in houses owned free and clear that appreciated during that
period but without a proportional increase in cash costs.136 Axel Borsch-Supan
To distinguish between both hypotheses, we need to estimate the
price and income elasticities of the proportions in which living arrange-
ments are chosen, as well as to contrast these elasticities with the
influence of demographic variables. We will estimate a variant of the
multinomial logit model describing the choice among the seven alter-
native living arrangements introduced in section 4.3 and depicted in
figure 4.1.
We consider the most frequent choice of living independently as the
base category and measure the attractiveness of the remaining six choices
relative to this category. We postulate that the attractiveness or (dis-)-
utility of each alternative relative to living independently can be de-
composed into three additive components. The first component de-
scribes the (dis-)utility of sharing accommodations either as head of
the joint household (denoted by HEAD) or as subfamily (denoted by
SUBF). The second component describes the attractiveness of the
partners, that is the (dis-)utility an elderly nucleus receives from living
with distant relatives (denoted by DREL) or with unrelated persons
(denoted by NREL). Living as elderly parents with adult children (de-
noted by PARE) serves as the base category for shared living
arrangements.
These utility components are a deterministic function v of regional
housing prices (denoted by PRI), nucleus income (INC), age of nucleus
members (AGE), the size of the nucleus (PER), and the sex of the
nucleus head (SEX), comprised in the vector X. In addition, a random
utility component |x, represents all unmeasurable factors that charac-
























+ VDREL(X) + ^,5,
+ VNREL(X) + \X6.
We assume that the |x, are mutually independent and logistically dis-
tributed and specify functions v linear in the explanatory variables.
Hence, the probability of choosing the alternative with the highest
attractiveness is of the familiar multinomial logit form (McFadden 1973).
Several comments are appropriate concerning the choice of this model.
First, all explanatory variables are nucleus-specific, but not alternative-
specific. An alternative model commonly used in this situation is the
logit model with alternative-specific coefficients, where for each rela-
tive utility component137 Household Dissolution and Alternative Living Arrangements
(2) a, - MINDEP = X'p,- + u.,,
i = 1, . . . , 6 or PARE-H, . . ., NREL-S.
Our specification simply economizes on the number of parameters by
imposing a set of linear restrictions on the 3,:
(3) P. - p2 = p4 - P5, and (3, - {33 = 34 - (V
In addition, these restrictions reflect a nonhierarchical pattern of sim-
ilarities among the alternatives.
Second, it would be desirable to allow for a more flexible specification
of the distribution of the unobserved utility components |x,. After ex-
cluding a general multivariate normal distribution because of its com-
putational intractability, an obvious choice is the generalized extreme
value distribution leading to the nested multinomial logit (NMNL) model.
However, the NMNL model is not identified in the context of explan-
atory variables that do not vary across alternatives.
8
Finally, the data include repeated observations of the same nucleus
but treat each observation independently. This assumption requires that
all nucleus-specific time-invariant utility components be included in the
explanatory variables. We are well aware that if in fact the unobserved
characteristics (x, correlate over time, the logit model will produce
inconsistent estimates. It is possible to correct for this potential in-
consistency by conditioning on the time-invariant, unobserved nucleus
characteristics (Chamberlain 1980). However, with nine cross sections,
this approach is prohibitively costly. Little is known about the mag-
nitude of this bias in the coefficients.
9 The longitudinal nature of the
data will also deflate the standard errors. Assuming essentially unbiased
estimates, the correct standard errors should be approximately twice
as large as reported.
1
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Table 4.11 presents parameter estimates of the choice model. The
estimates are based on a choice-based subsample of all 19,154 nuclei.
The subsample includes all nuclei that live with nonrelatives, a 0.05
percent random sample of independent nuclei, and intermediate-sized
random sample of nuclei in other living arrangements. The subsample
includes 3,081 nuclei and substantially economizes the estimation, while
including a sufficiently large number of observations for each living
arrangement to guarantee reliable estimation results. To correct for the
case-controlled or choice-based subsampling, the estimation procedure
re-weights each observation. The weights (the ratio of the percentage
of each alternative in the original sample over the percentage in the
subsample) vary by income class and cross section. The estimation
approach is a slight generalization of the weighted exogenous sampling
maximum likelihood (WESML) estimator proposed by Manski and
Lerman(1977).
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A striking result in table 4.11 is the predominance of demographic
variables relative to economic determinants. The coefficients measur-
ing housing prices are insignificant, the income elasticities are surpris-
ingly small. In contrast, age, nucleus size, and sex of single person
nuclei determine most of the observed variation in choices among living
arrangements. The overall fit, measured as the ratio of optimal over
diffuse likelihood value, is quite satisfactory.
We will first discuss the age variables. Nucleus age refers to the
average age of nucleus head and spouse; its sample mean is about 70
years. To be able to capture the important differences in housing choices
before and after age 75 discovered in table 4.7, we include age linearly
(measured in years) as well as quadratically (measured in squared years





















































Log likelihood at optimum -3,159.5
Log likelihood at zero -5,995.3












































































Note: Estimates are obtained by weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood
(WESML). Standard errors are not corrected for intertemporal correlations.139 Household Dissolution and Alternative Living Arrangements
old age; correspondingly, headship rates decline. However, at ages
below 75 years, becoming one year older still decreases the log-odds
of being a subfamily rather than living independently. The probabilities
of the HEAD alternatives decline uniformly in the relevant age range,
whereas the tendency to move as an elderly parent to a home headed
by an adult child increases steadily. All these patterns correspond to
simple intuition and the tabulations in section 4.4. We will compute
these predicted age profiles in more detail below.
The variable PER (persons) represents the number of persons in
the nucleus, therefore also the marital status of its head (PER = 1,
if the elderly person is widowed, divorced, or never married, in general
PER = 2 otherwise).
1
2 Not surprisingly, elderly couples strongly pre-
fer to live independently. If they share housing, they prefer to head
the joint household, other things being equal. They regard doubling-
up with nonrelatives as a strongly inferior alternative. The odds of
preferring such a living arrangement are about 12 times lower than
for single elderly.
The variable FEM (female) indicates that the head of {he nucleus is
female which is relevant for one-person nuclei. After correcting for
differences in income and age between single male and single female
elderly, males are much more likely to live together with nonrelated
persons in one household; the odds of their choosing this alternative
being 3.6 times higher than among female persons.
Of the economic variables, PRI (price) denotes a housing price index
of owner-occupied housing computed by Brown and Yinger (1986).
The index represents after-tax user cost of a typical single-family home
and includes historical appreciation as well as the federal income tax
advantages of homeownership for the relevant income range. Because
of the very large ownership rates, an owner-oriented price index seems
to be the most appropriate index of housing costs for the elderly. The
index is computed from AHS tabulations. The index is not SMSA-
specific and varies only by the four census regions: Northeast, Mid-
west, South, and West. However, regional and inter temporal price
variation is very large because the second half of the sample period
encompasses the rapid rise in housing costs, starting in the West, then
picking up in the remainder of the United States. In spite of this dra-
matic change in housing prices, virtually no price effect can be found
in our estimation.
The variable INC (income) represents the nucleus's currrent income,
measured in $1,000 per year deflated by the Consumer Price Index with
base year 1980. Its sample mean is about 10.0. The estimated coeffi-
cients indicate a precisely measured, but surprisingly small, income
effect in favor of living independently. The log-odds ratio of choosing
to live as a subfamily rather than independently decreases by 0.1061140 Axel Borsch-Supan
for an income increase of $1,000. At first sight, these results seem to
reject the "income distribution hypothesis" in favor of the notion that
housing consumption of the elderly is very inert. Even if the income
of the elderly had declined as much as in the general population, the
lack of responsiveness of household dissolution decisions to income
changes would have predicted an essentially unchanged housing con-
sumption pattern.
Because the author of this paper is an economist, not a demographer,
the paper would have ended at this point. However, believing in eco-
nomics after all, we reestimated the model in two different ways. First,
the sample was stratified into three income classes and each income
class estimated separately. Second, the pooled cross sections were
decomposed into an early sample period (1974-76), a middle period
(1977-79), and a late period (1980-83).
Table 4.12 presents the results stratified by income class. The lower
income class extends to $5,000 per year, and the upper income class
begins with a yearly income in excess of $10,000.
Quite clearly, there are very strong differences between the income
classes. The statistical hypothesis that the estimated relationships are
homogenous with respect to income class can easily be rejected.
1
3
Whereas the coefficients for housing prices and demographic variables
are essentially stable, most of this difference can be found in the income
variable. Low-income nuclei are highly income responsive, about 5
times as much as was estimated in the pooled regression in table 4.11.
Income responses among the other two income groups are essentially
insignificant, while a perverse sign characterizes the middle-income
group.
1
4 Low-income elderly comprise almost half of the sample (1,404
out of 3,081). Hence, the aggregation error in table 4.11 is considerable,
and we will use this disaggregate model for the applications in
section 4.6.
The result of high income elasticities among the poor elderly cor-
responds to earlier findings that predicted very elastic household for-
mation rates for single elderly women participating in a general housing
allowances program (Borsch-Supan 1986). It also revives the hypoth-
esis that without the double indexation of Social Security income the
United States may have experienced a much larger incidence of doubling-
up among the elderly than was actually the case. For more affluent
elderly, economic considerations appear to be irrelevant in the decision
about living arrangements.
We performed a second sample stratification to investigate whether
tastes have changed from 1974 to 1983, reestimating the model sepa-
rately for the periods 1974-76, 1977-79, and 1980-83. This decom-
position also alleviates the econometric problems of pooling cross
















































































































































































































Note: See table 4.11.
invariant utility components. Estimated coefficients are presented in
table 4.13. The results are qualitatively unchanged from table 4.11, and
the likelihood ratio test version of the Chow-test is insignificant. If any
at all, the income elasticities show a rising tendency both in terms of
magnitude and significance. The stability of the results is a fair indi-
cation that the potential inconsistency of the logit results may not be
a severe problem in this data set.
4.6 Simulations and Applications of the Model
What do the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients imply? How
do living arrangement decisions vary by age and income? Are the




























































Log likelihood at zero
Number of observations










































































































































between declining headship rates among young nuclei and a rising
proportion of elderly living independently in the early 1980s? We will
try to answer these questions by evaluating predicted choice proba-
bilities generated by the multinomial logit models in table 4.12 in various
scenarios.
Table 4.14 presents predicted age profiles for the three income classes.
Clearly, poorer elderly not only have a lower tendency to live inde-
pendently but also give up this status earlier than elderly with higher
incomes. The reversal in the choice probability of living independently
occurs at 70.5 years for elderly nuclei with yearly incomes below $5,000,
at 75.5 years for the middle-income group, and at 78.5 years for those




















































































































































































































Note: All predictions are based on the disaggregate model in table 4.12.
Once they dissolve their households, the upper-income classes are
more likely to be received by their adult children or by more distant
relatives. The pattern is different for poorer elderly among whom a
large proportion stays head of a two-generation household. As opposed
to the low-income strata, elderly nuclei with incomes above $5,000
become increasingly likely to also be received by distant or unrelated
persons. However, this trend is statistically insignificant.
Which living arrangements would elderly Americans have chosen in
the absence of the rise in real income generated by Social Security
indexation? Table 4.15 presents estimated changes that would have
occurred if the income of elderly nuclei had exhibited a similar devel-
opment as the income of younger nuclei. Using the observed income
at 1974, we computed the hypothetical elderly's income by using an
income index calculated from the sample of young nuclei. Columns 1











.15 Predicted Proportions of Nuclei Living Independently if Income






































































Note: The entries in columns 1 and 3 represent the differences between baseline pre-
diction (using the elderly's actual income) and alternative prediction (deflating the el-
derly's income at the rate of the general income develpment). The entries in columns 2
and 4 represent the yearly changes of the alternative prediction. Column 5 represents
the yearly changes of the actual proportions among young nuclei (table 4.2). All pre-
dictions are based on the disaggregate model in table 4.12.
nuclei with income below $5,000 and for all nuclei. The differences are
substantial for poor nuclei, but they are not large enough to explain a
similar decrease in headship rates among all elderly as was observed
among young nuclei. This is indicated in columns 2, 4, and 5, which
compare the yearly changes in the proportion of elderly living inde-
pendently with the actural changes in this category among the young
nuclei.
We conclude that the divergence in the income development sub-
stantially contributed to the steady increase in the proportion of elderly
living independently, but that this explanation in itself is not sufficient
to account for the entire discrepancy in choosing living arrangements
between young and elderly Americans.
4.7 Summary of Conclusions
1. About a third of all nuclei with at least one elderly person do not
live independently. As opposed to an increase in the proportion of
doubled-up households in the general population in the early 1980s,
this percentage has fallen among elderly Americans.
2. The emerging discrepancy in living arrangement choices between
young and elderly can only partially be explained by the discrepancy145 Household Dissolution and Alternative Living Arrangements
in the income development from 1974 to 1983. The residual may be
attributed to inertia due to low mobility and slow adaptation to eco-
nomic changes.
3. More than 17 percent of all elderly nuclei live with their adult
children. In most of these cases, the parents head the common house-
hold. If the children are household heads, the parents are usually single
and old with a small income.
4. Within these two-generation households, important intergenera-
tional changes occurred from 1974 to 1983. An increasing percentage
of these households are headed by the parent generation rather than
the adult child. We speculate that this development can be attributed
to the housing affordability crisis among young first-time home buyers.
5. Few elderly live with distant relatives (the proportion is less than
9 percent), and very few elderly share the household with nonrelatives
(about 3 percent).
6. The choice probabilities among living arrangements are predom-
inantly determined by demographic variables. There is no evidence
that they respond to an aggregate price index of owner-occupied housing.
7. The "demand elasticity for shared accommodations" with respect
to income is strongly negative for elderly with low incomes. However,
for elderly nuclei with yearly incomes in excess of $5,000, the income
elasticity is insignificant after correcting for demographic variables.
8. In elderly parents-adult children households, there is some evi-
dence that the corresponding "supply elasticity for shared accommo-
dations" with respect to income is positive: children who "receive"
their parents have about twice than average nucleus income.
Notes
1. The 1978 National Sample contains a supplement on disabilities.
2. The AHS can be augmented with data from the National Nursing Home
Survey. This is a subject for further research.
3. The creation of this data base is a large, mostly mechanical task that is
not particularly glamorous but devoured most of the work for this paper.
4. Complex households are assigned to the above categories in the stated
order.
5. See Becker's (1981) treatise or the paper by Ermisch (1981).
6. If the nucleus consists of a married couple, age refers to the average age
of husband and spouse. Sex of nucleus head is a somewhat ambiguous concept
because the head of a nucleus is only well denned in the trivial case of one-
person nuclei or self-reported in one-nuclei households. Otherwise, we as-
signed the head status to the male.
7. A table similar to table 4.5 indicates that the corresponding age of the
receiving child nucleus is quite young (52.8 years).146 Axel Borsch-Supan
8. There is no variation in the inclusive values to identify the dissimilarity
parameters.
9. See Borsch-Supan and Pollakowski (1988) for an application and sensitivity
analysis using a panel of three cross sections.
10. The 3,081 observations in the estimation sample represent between 700
and 800 different nuclei.
11. See McFadden, Winston, and Borsch-Supan (1985) for details, including
a derivation of the appropriate asymptotic covariance matrix. The WESML
estimation approach is not necessary to consistently estimate the coefficients
in the MNL model. Inclusion of alternative specific constants would serve the
same purpose. However, these constants are highly collinear with PER and
FEM, which makes the WESML approach more attractive.
12. There are some cases of elderly nuclei with own children under age 18.
13. The likelihood ratio test statistic is 188.2 [the log likelihood of the con-
strained estimation is 3159.5 (table 4.11); the likelihood of the unconstrained
model (table 4.12) is 3065.4]. The chi-squared value for 50 degrees of freedom
at 0.99 confidence is 76.2.
14. Note that the reported standard errors ignore inter temporal correlations.
Correct standard errors are approximately twice as large.
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Comment John M. Quigley
There is much to applaud in Axel Borsch-Supan's careful empirical
analysis of the household and housing choices of the elderly. First is
the explicit recognition of the endogeneity of the household itself. Sec-
ond is the demonstration that the decision to combine adults to form
a household is amenable to economic analysis. To those of you who
have seen undergraduates doubling, tripling, or living in communes in
high-rent cities like Boston this may not be implausible. This way of
looking at households is, however, almost totally foreign to those public
officials charged with forecasting future housing or construction needs.
These analyses, undertaken by HUD, by the FHLBB, even by the
Federal Reserve, typically take projected age distributions of the pop-
ulation and mechanically transform them to numbers of households—
which are then compared to numbers of available dwellings.
The third striking feature of the paper is the endogeneity of the
household head in extended families. When the elderly member has
the highest income, he or she is the head of the extended family. When
the child has the money, the child is the head. It has become an awkward
thing to unravel male-female, husband-wife, from head-spouse on ques-
tionnaire data, and apparently will become more so as incomes within
households get more equal.
Fourth, the statistical methodology employed by Borsch-Supan is
unambiguously appropriate to this problem. In several of the papers
discussed at this conference, considerable attention was paid to re-
ducing the information conveyed by an important measurement, for
example, by converting a continuous measure of household income or
hours worked into a binary variable measuring poverty or retirement
status. This paper avoids these complications.
The paper's substantive conclusions are that an elderly person's
choice of living conditions—independence, living with children, etc.—
is sensitive to the age and sex of that householder and to whether the
person's spouse is still living. At incomes less than $5,000, household
choice is also responsive to income; for the lower half of the income
distribution of the elderly, annual income matters a lot. Axel finds the
irrelevance of housing price (the user cost of housing capital) to these
choice surprising. I find it less so since such a large fraction of the
elderly are homeowners with clear title and no mortgage payments.
Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data, I discov-
ered recently that less than 50 percent of younger households with
John M. Quigley is Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the University of
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outstanding mortgages were able to compute the components of user
cost in a consistent manner. For example, the outstanding mortgage
balance, the monthly payment, and the mortgage term were internally
inconsistent and yielded implausible interest rates for a great many
households.
Despite the lack of statistical significance of the price term in the
logit models, the tabulations reported in the paper suggest that, over
time, as interest rates rose and housing prices increased, a larger frac-
tion of elderly households took in their children as subtenants. An-
ecdotal evidence from elsewhere under a variety of different institutions
supports this kind of effect. For example, in Budapest, where price
controls and a stagnant supply have made the shadow prices of rental
housing very large, elderly renters routinely take in young households
as subtenants, providing shelter or assigning them the right to assume
rental contracts in return for household help and private nursing care
(Harsman and Quigley 1988). The socialist alternative.
The real problems I see with this paper do not arise from Axel's
clear and careful analysis, but rather from his choice of data set. The
decision to use the Annual Housing Survey (AHS) locks the analyst
into three sets of data problems. First, the AHS is a sample of dwelling
units. As such it excludes intermediate care facilities, nursing homes,
and various kinds of congregate facilities. There is simply no way to
describe these alternatives or to use the generic utility indicators, which
have been so carefully estimated, to simulate the effects of policy
changes (or merely income or price changes) upon the propensity to
choose these unexplored options. The importance of these options is
growing. Garber's paper (ch. 9, in this volume) suggests that 5 percent
of the elderly live in congregate facilities, making it the second or third
most likely living arrangement. It's surely the most expensive.
Second, the AHS contains not a scrap of information on the health
status of the elderly. Casual empiricism applied to the elderly of the
middle class—my own family stories and those of virtually everyone
I know—suggests that the independence of the elderly in their living
condition is as fragile as an arthritic hip or a burst blood vessel. Of
course, this is consistent with Axel's finding that the income elasticity
of choice among middle-class elderly households is low. But this latter
description is way off point.
Third, the pooling of a decade's worth of data on a panel of dwelling
units—to achieve sufficiently large samples for the rarer alternatives—
is quite dangerous. Since the sampling frame is dwelling units, a panel
of "stayers" is mixed with a sample of "movers," causing serious
problems in inference and interpretation. This problem is not merely
the inaccurate degrees of freedom and misleading standard errors noted
by the author. It is well known that the probability of "staying" at149 Household Dissolution and Alternative Living Arrangements
t + 1 is higher for those who have "stayed" at t. This individual-
specific but unobserved heterogeneity could be accounted for, as Axel
notes, but only by poaching on the Rust computer budget. But there's
another problem here that arises because the attachment to residential
amenities and "neighborhood" increases as households remain stayers.
I've recently tried to sort out these effects, estimating mobility models
from the PSID. It appears that, even when unobserved heterogeneity
is controlled for, in the Heckman-Flynn sense, the mobility hazard is
at least inversely proportional to duration (Quigley 1987). This is quite
consistent with the arguments of Dynarski (1985) about the increasing
importance of neighborhood attributes and amenity (or, in the termi-
nology of Venti and Wise, of nonmonetary transactions costs which
increase with duration). It would be very hard to address duration
effects or the timing of choices within the framework Borsch-Supan
has chosen.
These problems are unfortunate; they limit the applicability of the
specific findings of an otherwise interesting and creative effort. One
can believe the cross-sectional descriptive results presented and still
doubt the conclusions about the causal effects of income and price
upon the household choices of the elderly.
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